A Defesa dos Agentes Públicos pela Advocacia-Geral da União sob a Perspectiva da Teoria da Agência

This article aims to examine the phenomenon of the representation of public agents by the AGU (Advocacia-Geral da União), investigating its relationship with agency problems. This is a qualitative exploratory research executed through the content analysis method, using as secondary data the rules that govern the matter, news reports on the procedure, and the list of judicial proceedings in which the AGU represented public agents, obtained in compliance with the Law of Access to Information. As primary data, interviews were conducted with AGU members who acted in the authorization process of representation of public agents by the AGU or in the judicial process itself, scrutinizing the agency dilemma. A high success rate of AGU was found. The data analysis justifies the legal body’s action, recognizing the legitimacy of the procedure without pointing out any conflict of interest. Studies indicate that information asymmetry and flawed incentive systems do not explain any agency conflict in the investigated phenomenon but indicate that agent error or subjective sentiment forming political-ideological bias can cause an agency dilemma.