Strategically (in)secure and economically (in)vulnerable: Australia, New Zealand, and their relations with China

This article considers the extent to which the expectations embedded in Allan Gyngell's assessment–that Australia is strategically vulnerable but economically secure and New Zealand is economically vulnerable but strategically secure–are borne out in the strategic posture adopted by the two countries in managing their bilateral relationship with China in recent years. We argue that Gyngell's assessment is not obsolete, but that the policy differences between Canberra and Wellington are flattening. Heightened perceptions of vulnerability, both strategically and economically, are leading both Canberra and Wellington to adopt increasingly cautious and similarly arms-length approaches to their relations with Beijing. With the caveat that measuring foreign policy responses is a fraught and inexact task, we present a measurement framework and evidence drawn from the 2017 to 2024 period to reach this finding, which saw the two countries shift incrementally away from China. The Trans-Tasman allies converged more in how they see the world, and what they ought to do in response.