Punishment is slower than cooperation or defection in online network games

Punishment serves as a balancing force that dissuades people from acting selfishly, which complements cooperation as an essential characteristic for the prosperity of human societies. Past studies using economic games with two options (cooperation and defection) reported that cooperation decisions are generally faster than defection decisions and that time pressure possibly induces human players to be more intuitive and thus cooperative. However, it is unclear where punishment decisions sit on this time spectrum. Therefore, we recruited human players and implemented two series of online network games with cooperation, defection, and punishment options. First, we find that punishment decisions are slower than cooperation or defection decisions across both game series. Second, we find that imposing experimental time pressure on in-game decisions neither reduces nor increases the frequency of punishment decisions, suggesting that time pressure may not directly interact with the mechanisms that drive players to choose to punish.

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Publication Details

Journal
Scientific Reports
Published
2024-10-03
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-72939-2
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
1.13
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Punishment is slower than cooperation or defection in online network games

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article

Punishment is slower than cooperation or defection in online network games

Ryunosuke Goto, Akihiro Nishi, George Dewey, Hiroyasu Ando, Ryo Ikesu, Timothy F Brewer
article en
1 citations

Abstract

Punishment serves as a balancing force that dissuades people from acting selfishly, which complements cooperation as an essential characteristic for the prosperity of human societies. Past studies using economic games with two options (cooperation and defection) reported that cooperation decisions are generally faster than defection decisions and that time pressure possibly induces human players to be more intuitive and thus cooperative. However, it is unclear where punishment decisions sit on this time spectrum. Therefore, we recruited human players and implemented two series of online network games with cooperation, defection, and punishment options. First, we find that punishment decisions are slower than cooperation or defection decisions across both game series. Second, we find that imposing experimental time pressure on in-game decisions neither reduces nor increases the frequency of punishment decisions, suggesting that time pressure may not directly interact with the mechanisms that drive players to choose to punish.

Scientific ReportsVol. 14(1)
University of California, Los Angeles (US), UCLA Health (US), Machine Intelligence Research Institute (US), University of Tokyo Hospital (JP)
Openalex Percentile: Top 16%
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
1.13
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