Task-Specific Experience, Tacit Knowledge, and Compensation Contracts

ABSTRACT This study experimentally examines whether managers’ task-specific experience influences their reliance on performance-based contracts to motivate employees to perform cognitively stimulating tasks. Building on experiential learning theory, we predict managers who acquire task-specific experience by doing the employee’s task possess tacit knowledge about the task’s cognitive stimulation and associated intrinsic motivation. To motivate their employees, these managers will prefer a fixed-wage contract, which relies on intrinsic motivation, over a performance-based contract. Our results support these predictions. Managers who perform the employee’s task are less likely to choose the performance-based contract than managers who only read a description of the task. Additional analysis shows managers’ perception of the task’s cognitive stimulation and employees’ intrinsic motivation to complete the task explain the contract choice. We run three additional experiments to better understand the impact of task-specific experience on contract choice. Our study underscores the importance of task-specific experience for compensation contract design. JEL Classifications: C91; D83; M4.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Management Accounting Research
Published
2024-10-03
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2023-070
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.53
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article

Task-Specific Experience, Tacit Knowledge, and Compensation Contracts

Eddy Cardinaels, Bart Dierynck, Huaxiang Yin, Nathalie Beckers
1 citations
Journal of Management Accounting Research
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
0.53
article

Task-Specific Experience, Tacit Knowledge, and Compensation Contracts

Eddy Cardinaels, Bart Dierynck, Huaxiang Yin, Nathalie Beckers
article en
1 citations

Abstract

ABSTRACT This study experimentally examines whether managers’ task-specific experience influences their reliance on performance-based contracts to motivate employees to perform cognitively stimulating tasks. Building on experiential learning theory, we predict managers who acquire task-specific experience by doing the employee’s task possess tacit knowledge about the task’s cognitive stimulation and associated intrinsic motivation. To motivate their employees, these managers will prefer a fixed-wage contract, which relies on intrinsic motivation, over a performance-based contract. Our results support these predictions. Managers who perform the employee’s task are less likely to choose the performance-based contract than managers who only read a description of the task. Additional analysis shows managers’ perception of the task’s cognitive stimulation and employees’ intrinsic motivation to complete the task explain the contract choice. We run three additional experiments to better understand the impact of task-specific experience on contract choice. Our study underscores the importance of task-specific experience for compensation contract design. JEL Classifications: C91; D83; M4.

Journal of Management Accounting ResearchVol. 37(2)
Nanyang Technological University (SG), Tilburg University (NL), KU Leuven (BE)
Decent work and economic growth
Openalex Percentile: Top 26%
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
0.53
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Task-Specific Experience, Tacit Knowledge, and Compensation Contracts — Eddy Cardinaels, Bart Dierynck, et al. · Journal of Management Accounting Research (2024) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS