Akt przekonania w ujęciu Jana Łukasiewicza a idiogeniczna teoria sądu

The aim of this article is to provide a comparative analysis of (i) the act of belief in Jan Łukasiewicz’s conception and (ii) the act of judging in the view of idiogenic theory of judgment. According to Łukasiewicz, the act of belief is not a propositional entity, which reproduces (correctly or not) the states of affairs to which it is intentional directed. Consequently, the act of belief is not a carrier of truth but rather a feeling of reality of something to what it is directed. If one analyses Łukasiewicz’s remarks about beliefs, he would agree that the act of belief is the same as the act of judging understood within the idiogenic theory of judgment. In turn, in phenomenological terms: Łukasiewicz’s belief and idiogenic act of judging could be defined as “thetical moment” or “moment of capturing the reality” (R. Ingarden) or Setzungsmoment (E. Husserl).