Dangerous Gifts: Imperialism, Security, and Civil Wars in the Levant, 1798–1864 By Hilmi OzanÖzavcı. Oxford University Press, 2021. 432 pages. $40, paper.

The shadow of a great-power rivalry once more has fallen over the Middle East. The growth of Chinese footprints in the region has drawn attention and creates an impression of competition with the United States. In addition to being the region's biggest oil customer, Beijing has vast economic investments and burgeoning military relations with many states. To counter this influence, the United States has been looking for new ways to maintain its primary position. As the US-China rivalry becomes more intense, the Middle East will likely be one of its primary arenas. In this respect, analyzing the 19th century great-power rivalries in the Middle East is an exercise in brain gymnastics that provides windows into today's world. However, Hilmi Ozan Özavcı’s book, Dangerous Gifts: Imperialism, Security, and Civil Wars in the Levant, 1798–1864, is not an ordinary history of the Eastern question. Although the author retells familiar historical accounts of Egypt's Mehmed Ali Pasha, power politics, and the violence in Mount Lebanon and Damascus, he uses multiple projectors from different angles to illuminate the period. Like movies that convey the narrative from the points of view of multiple protagonists, this study presents many characters, each with different motivations, prejudices, and ambitions. Leveraging his detailed study of primary and secondary sources in a variety of languages, Özavcı shows his readers how personal animosities influenced state actions during international crises. He does this through illuminating historical figures like Mustafa Resid Pasa instead of hiding behind abstract ideas or a monolithic understanding of states. This method allows us to see how individuals’ understandings of the world can institutionalize and shape state policies. This focus on human actors also makes the book more entertaining. What does Dangerous Gifts tell us about the contemporary great-power rivalry in the Middle East? First, such competition is not an inevitable consequence of fixed state interests defined by the balance of power. This contradicts the famous saying of Lord Palmerston: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” Özavcı shows, to the contrary, that those interests are neither eternal nor perpetual but a product of perceptions, capabilities, and diplomacy. Different actors and officials have different understandings of reality and therefore different interpretations of interests. World politics emerges from a dynamic bargaining process between inter- and intrastate actors. To be sure, the material world imposes some constraints and incentives. But it is individuals who interpret these and decide on their interests and those of their states. Thus, a US-China rivalry in the Middle East is not an inevitable destiny that the global power system imposes; their relations will result from the interplay of state and nonstate actors, ideas, material capabilities, and diplomacy. Özavcı repeatedly emphasizes that local actors are the region's primary agents. Of course, the British Empire, Russia, France, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire intervened in the Middle East and influenced its fate. It is also possible to see the differences in capabilities that colonial and local actors enjoyed. Nevertheless, despite the military, political, and technological superiority of the European powers, it was still the local actors that played the primary role. They “have never been the ‘gullible objects’ or ‘bargaining chips’ merely in need of foreign aid,” Özavcı argues (p. 362). The primacy of regional actors is more visible today, and they are more enthusiastic about taking matters into their hands. This does not necessarily mean that citizens or civil society will increase their power. Nevertheless, to secure their interests, decision makers in Washington and Beijing must first negotiate with countries in the region. Therefore, to understand the rivalry in the regional context, analyzing local dynamics and actors is more important than examining great-power strategies. In parallel, Özavcı depicts dynamics like sectarianism as authentic to the region rather than the work of external actors. He argues that “European and Ottoman imperial actors” benefited from “the existing crevice in the social order” of the region (p. 244). It is important to note that those crevices were genuine local products. Thus, the author does not glorify the “locals” to accuse colonialists, imperialists, or other external actors of responsibility for all the mischief. More important, regional states or nonstate actors may try to recruit great powers for their own causes or try to influence decision-making mechanisms in Washington and Beijing. Özavcı relates how Mehmed Ali and Mustafa Reşit competed to gain public sympathy in Paris and draw France to their side. Far from being passive objects, the locals can use rivalries and conflicts between great powers for their own gains. Similarly, regional actors today, seeking advantages within their states or against others, try to influence superpower perceptions and bargain for their vast resources. This may fuel the rivalry between the United States and China. Thus, regional crevices can easily turn into bait for great powers and fan the flames of hegemonic rivalry. On the other hand, the contemporary great-power rivalry is not a simple replay of the 19th century's Eastern question. Neither Washington nor Beijing wants to give “dangerous gifts”—superpower interventions that are justified as benevolent acts—to the region anymore. The invasion of Iraq, the Afghan occupation, and the war on terror have exhausted American policy makers and public opinion. Most officials and stakeholders in the United States see major initiatives in the Middle East as a waste of resources and strategic blunders. Chinese decision makers seem to have drawn similar lessons; although they are eager to strengthen bilateral relations in the Middle East, they stay away from undertaking the regional police role that the United States has played. Therefore, unlike with the Eastern question, today's great powers are not eager for direct involvement in the region or a new civilizational project. Instead, they want to bargain with local power brokers. Although history does not repeat itself, the Eastern question does offer benchmarks that can help us understand a new superpower rivalry in the region. Özavcı’s Dangerous Gifts is a remarkable book on the subject. The Eastern question is a subject well covered among leading historians. Yet, with its elegant language, rich archival research, and novel methodology, Özavcı’s book will have a considerable place in this voluminous literature.