The Phenomenon of Difficult Enforcement in the Circuit Trial System in China from the Perspective of Power Operation

The phenomenon of "difficulty in enforcement" is prevalent in the judicial practice of China and poses similar challenges to circuit trials. This paper, based on Su Li's premise of the shifting local power dynamics in rural China, utilizes Foucault's theory of micro-power and Geertz's theory of local knowledge to explore how these misalignments in local power relationships affect the enforcement work in circuit trials in China, and provides suggestions on how to alleviate this issue. In the power relationship of enforcement within circuit trials, the relatively weaker state power struggles to support the compulsory execution of judgments, while the relatively stronger individual power resists the enforcement of judgments. This leads to a reliance on the recognition and cooperation of the judgment debtor, as well as the assistance of local power as a third party. However, the lack of local knowledge among judges makes it difficult for "legally sound but unreasonable" judgments to gain the recognition and cooperation of the parties involved, resulting in challenges to enforcement. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen cooperation with local powers and other state agencies, seeking a multi-faceted approach.