The Meloni-Casellati Institutional Reform

Abstract This study examines the Meloni-Casellati institutional reform in Italy. This reform constitutes a relevant political fact that could potentially affect the functioning of political institutions and the behavior of political actors in the country. The reform aims to strengthen the link between voter preferences and government formation and enhance government stability. The proposal, consisting of four substantive articles, abolishes life senators, modifies the Head of State’s dissolution powers, introduces the direct election of the prime minister and a peculiar confidence mechanism. This study explores the historical context and motivations behind the reform proposal, examining its potential impact on the country’s politics. Then, it describes the various steps of the reform drafting. Finally, it compares the Meloni-Casellati proposal with Israel’s 1992–2001 experiment concerning the direct election of the prime minister, scrutinizing similarities and differences. If approved, the reform will introduce a new, unprecedented government system in Italy, that has never been adopted elsewhere. As such, this topic poses relevant theoretical challenges for political science research, eliciting scholarly attention about Italian politics, government forms, institutional design, and ruling and opposition parties behavior.