Malebranche’s Conflicting Moralities? Hume’s Objection, Quietism, and Motivation

abstract: Hume criticizes Malebranche for endorsing an “abstract theory of morals” founded on reason that leaves no role for sentiment. One response in the literature argues that although Malebranche started by endorsing the kind of “abstract” morality Hume rejects, he increasingly replaced this with an incompatible “sensible” morality based on “physical motives” deriving from pleasure. However, I argue that a basis for both moralities is present in Malebranche from the start, and indeed that they are compatible parts of a single morality. In developing this argument, I draw particularly on his contribution to the dispute in early modern France over a Quietist account of “pure love.” This contribution reveals that although he did accept the sort of theory of moral truth that Hume criticized, Malebranche at the same time endorsed a theory of moral motivation that is similar in important respects to what we find in Hume.