Controlling shareholders’ share pledge and share repurchase notices of listed companies

States encourage listed companies to use stock repurchase to elevate the market value of listed firms. After China's promulgation of the new Company Law in 2018, the number of listed companies that issued stock repurchase notices has increased, and the frequency is also increasing. But whether market value management is the real incentive for the action remains debatable. To reduce the risk of pledges, controlling shareholders may use stock repurchases to maintain the security of control rights, and stock repurchase notice may become a tool for controlling shareholders to manage pledge risks. From the perspective of pledge risk management, this paper selects the listed companies from 2012 to 2019 and finds that the share pledge of the controlling shareholder affects the stock repurchase behavior of listed companies by affecting the current pledge risk and the quality of information disclosure plays the interactive role between the two.

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Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
PLoS ONE
Published
2024-09-27
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0308614
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Corporate Finance and Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.95

Funders

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article

Controlling shareholders’ share pledge and share repurchase notices of listed companies

Limei Cao, Jiani Xie, Xiaoyun Zhu
1 citations
PLoS ONE
Corporate Finance and Governance
0.95
article

Controlling shareholders’ share pledge and share repurchase notices of listed companies

Limei Cao, Jiani Xie, Xiaoyun Zhu
article en
1 citations

Abstract

States encourage listed companies to use stock repurchase to elevate the market value of listed firms. After China's promulgation of the new Company Law in 2018, the number of listed companies that issued stock repurchase notices has increased, and the frequency is also increasing. But whether market value management is the real incentive for the action remains debatable. To reduce the risk of pledges, controlling shareholders may use stock repurchases to maintain the security of control rights, and stock repurchase notice may become a tool for controlling shareholders to manage pledge risks. From the perspective of pledge risk management, this paper selects the listed companies from 2012 to 2019 and finds that the share pledge of the controlling shareholder affects the stock repurchase behavior of listed companies by affecting the current pledge risk and the quality of information disclosure plays the interactive role between the two.

PLoS ONEVol. 19(9)
Guangdong University Of Finances and Economics (CN), Guangzhou Automobile Group (China) (CN), Guangdong University of Finance (CN), Guangzhou Huashang College, Jiangxi University of Science and Technology (CN)
Jilin Office of Philosophy and Social Science, National Office for Philosophy and Social Sciences
Openalex Percentile: Top 20%
Corporate Finance and Governance
0.95
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