No Self‐Reference, No Ownership?

Abstract A ‘no‐ownership’ or ‘no‐self theory’ holds that there is no proper subject of experience; the ownership of experience can only be accounted for by invoking a sub‐personal entity. In the recent self‐versus‐no‐self debate, it is widely assumed that the no‐referent view of ‘I’, which is closely associated with Wittgenstein and G. E. M. Anscombe, implies a no‐ownership theory of experience. I spell out this assumption with regard to both non‐reflective and reflective consciousness and show that it is false. If the so‐called ‘self’ is an individual, the person, nothing more is required for the ownership of sensations than the non‐reflective experiencing, undergoing, or suffering of them, whereas the sense of ‘ownership’ of reflective consciousness varies according to the type of ‘I’‐thought in question. Ownership of ‘I’‐thoughts about one’s own actions, for one thing, is a matter of being able to fit future actions to them or answer questions as to why one is doing what one does.