Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control for Connected Vehicle Systems Under Composite Attacks

This article investigates the cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC) problem under composite attacks. A novel resilient scheme is proposed for connected vehicle systems to deal with several types of attacks, including denial of service (DoS), camouflage, false-data injection (FDI), and actuator attacks. In contrast to the existing literature dealing with composite attacks, this work not only studies the effect of DoS and FDI attacks on CACC but also investigates the camouflage attacks and unbounded actuator attacks that are intentionally designed to mislead the platoon and jeopardize the dynamics of the vehicles. Also, it is considered that the information of the leader vehicle is not available to the follower vehicles and should be estimated. The proposed scheme is designed based on a two-layer approach to ensure effective CACC with ultimately bounded errors under the mentioned attacks. The presented algorithm is validated using two practical simulation examples.