The influence of politicians' sex on political budget cycles: An empirical analysis of Spanish municipalities

Abstract Does a politician's sex influence political budget cycles (PBCs)? We answer this question using a sample of Spanish municipalities from the Madrid region for the period 2010–2019. The Madrid region has a homogenous set of budget rules that allow consistent categorization of budget expenditure items as either “mandatory” or “non‐mandatory” public services. After differentiating between smaller and larger municipalities, gender influence is studied along two dimensions: the mayor's sex and the share of women in government. Our findings include, in regard to mandatory spending in smaller municipalities, that gender‐balanced governments induce PBCs. In larger municipalities, when the share of women in government is above 60%, electoral spending is increased by up to 10% of an average municipal budget for mandatory spending, and up to 2.2% for non‐mandatory. These findings are generally supported in a mixed‐gender close election analysis.