Evolutionary Game Analysis of Collaborative Prefabricated Buildings Development Behavior in China under Carbon Emissions Trading Schemes

Prefabricated buildings (PBs) are considered a green way to reduce energy consumption and carbon emissions in the construction industry due to their environmental and social benefits. However, PBs have obstacles such as high construction costs, immature technology, and insufficient policy incentives, and developers’ willingness to develop them needs to be higher. Therefore, it is necessary to explore how to motivate more developers to develop PBs. In this paper, we first discuss the impact of the carbon emissions trading scheme (ETS) on the construction industry and then consider the heterogeneity of construction developers, introduce a collaborative mechanism to establish a three-party evolutionary game model between the government and the heterogeneous developers, and explore the evolution of the three-party dynamic strategies through numerical simulation. The results show that developers’ initial development probability affects the system’s evolutionary trend, and the developer who obtains more low-carbon benefits plays a dominant role. Further analyses show that critical factors such as market profitability, synergistic benefits, and carbon tax price positively influence the development of PBs, and the influence of synergistic cooperation mechanisms should be especially emphasized. This study provides practical insights into the sustainable development of the construction industry and the government’s development of a suitable carbon portfolio policy for it. Including the construction industry in the ETS is recommended when carbon prices reach 110 RMB/t. At this point, the government can remove the subsidy for PBs, but the behaviors of the developers who participate in the ETS still need to be supervised.