Stealth Attacks on PCBs: An Experimental Plausibility Analysis
This paper reports - inspired by the Bloomberg article “The Big Hack” - on experiments researching the possibilities to manipulate Printed Circuit Boards (PCB) and the chances that such a manipulation can and will be detected. We used non-functional devices to showcase manipulations and are providing optical and X-ray pictures to illustrate how good or difficult it is to detect such manipulations. We researched hiding dies in parts of a PCB and under a BGA package. Our experiments clearly show that such manipulations are feasible and extremely hard to detect if done thoroughly.
Authors
- Dominik Klein (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7743-8399)
- Zoya Dyka (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6819-0467)
- Peter Langendöerfer (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6209-9048)
- Ievgen Kabin (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3838-6493)
- Dmytro Petryk (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4636-8831)
- Sven Freud
- Jan Schaeffner
- Alkistis Sigourou
Institutions
- Federal Office for Information Security (DE)
- Leibniz Institute for High Performance Microelectronics (DE)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2024-09-02
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/csr61664.2024.10679465
- Citations
- 1
- Primary Topic
- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.49