Detection of GPS Spoofing Attacks in UAVs Based on Adversarial Machine Learning Model

Advancements in wireless communication and automation have revolutionized mobility systems, notably through autonomous vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). UAV spatial coordinates, determined via Global Positioning System (GPS) signals, are susceptible to cyberattacks due to unencrypted and unauthenticated transmissions with GPS spoofing being a significant threat. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) for UAVs have been developed and enhanced using machine learning (ML) algorithms. However, Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) has introduced new risks by exploiting ML models. This study presents a UAV-IDS employing AML methodology to enhance the detection and classification of GPS spoofing attacks. The key contribution is the development of an AML detection model that significantly improves UAV system robustness and security. Our findings indicate that the model achieves a detection accuracy of 98%, demonstrating its effectiveness in managing large-scale datasets and complex tasks. This study emphasizes the importance of physical layer security for enhancing IDSs in UAVs by introducing a novel detection model centered on an adversarial training defense method and advanced deep learning techniques.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Sensors
Published
2024-09-23
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/s24186156
Citations
16
Primary Topic
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
5.56

Funders

Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Detection of GPS Spoofing Attacks in UAVs Based on Adversarial Machine Learning Model

Reemah Alhebshi, Lamia Alhoraibi, Daniyal Alghazzawi
16 citations
Sensors
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
5.56
article

Detection of GPS Spoofing Attacks in UAVs Based on Adversarial Machine Learning Model

Reemah Alhebshi, Lamia Alhoraibi, Daniyal Alghazzawi
article en
16 citations

Abstract

Advancements in wireless communication and automation have revolutionized mobility systems, notably through autonomous vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). UAV spatial coordinates, determined via Global Positioning System (GPS) signals, are susceptible to cyberattacks due to unencrypted and unauthenticated transmissions with GPS spoofing being a significant threat. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) for UAVs have been developed and enhanced using machine learning (ML) algorithms. However, Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) has introduced new risks by exploiting ML models. This study presents a UAV-IDS employing AML methodology to enhance the detection and classification of GPS spoofing attacks. The key contribution is the development of an AML detection model that significantly improves UAV system robustness and security. Our findings indicate that the model achieves a detection accuracy of 98%, demonstrating its effectiveness in managing large-scale datasets and complex tasks. This study emphasizes the importance of physical layer security for enhancing IDSs in UAVs by introducing a novel detection model centered on an adversarial training defense method and advanced deep learning techniques.

SensorsVol. 24(18)
King Abdulaziz University (SA)
King Abdulaziz University
Openalex Percentile: Top 4%
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
5.56
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Detection of GPS Spoofing Attacks in UAVs Based on Adversarial Machine Learning Model — Reemah Alhebshi, Lamia Alhoraibi, et al. · Sensors (2024) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS