NORMATIVE REASON VS. ANTHROPOLOGY: SOMETHING ABOUT KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT

The article is devoted to the problem of the relationship between normative reason and anthropology in Kant's critical philosophy. This problem is considered in close connection with the concept of the transcendental subject, the basic concept of Kantian philosophy, as this concept applies to both theoretical and practical philosophy; this subject is also manifested in the aesthetic power of judgements and judgements of expediency. Attention is drawn to several levels of Kant's transcendental subject, where the transcendental unity of apperception, Self, is of primary importance. It is this level that Kant considered as the highest point of synthesis - both inner experience (mental) and outer experience (empirical experience) since the transcendental Self accompanies all acts of consciousness, will and power of judgement, both aesthetic and expediency judgement. In addition, other levels of transcendental subjectivity are considered, which relate to the activity of reason, especially practical reason, which is associated with the normative activity of the subject. In this context, the interaction of Kant's anthropology and its various models, with what the German philosopher defined as anthroponomy is analysed. Various aspects of this concept, its importance for the understanding of Kant's doctrine of the normative activity of reason, its ability to produce normative and legal norms of human common life, and the relationship between transcendental and anthropological aspects in this constitution are considered. Thus, Kant's discovery of anthroponomy as one of the basic dimensions of the transcendental subject, its intersection with the anthropological characteristics of man, is a significant achievement of critical philosophy. We are only on the verge of clarifying the semantic possibilities of this extremely productive conceptual construction of the eminent German philosopher.