A VIRTUE ETHICS FOR HISTORIANS: PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS

ABSTRACT How feasible would it be to develop a virtue ethics for historians that is analogous or similar to virtue‐ethical approaches to research integrity that have been proposed for other areas of academic inquiry? The field of history is an interesting one, as few disciplines have an equally well‐documented history of thinking, talking, and writing about virtues. This history merits ethicists’ attention, as it offers a unique opportunity for grounding ethical reflection in the lived realities of historical research and teaching. In the spirit of a “history and philosophy of history,” this article contributes to such a project by staging a conversation between virtue ethics and the history of historiography. Drawing on a range of nineteenth‐ and twentieth‐century examples, it argues that much of what applied virtue ethicists are recommending scholars to do has a long pedigree in the history of historiography. Critical virtue ethics, too, is a project to which historians can easily relate, especially insofar as they are committed to virtues of truthfulness in an age of post‐truth. If this suggests that there is room, or perhaps even a need, for a virtue ethics for historians, the cases examined in this article also prompt critical questions, especially ones regarding the teachability of virtue, the potential of virtue talk to be misused for polemical and exclusionary purposes, and the sort of tasks that a virtue ethics is capable of addressing. In light of these considerations, the article calls for reflection on the “affordances” of virtue. It claims that the case for a virtue ethics will be strongest if it is grounded in a realistic understanding not only of the beneficial uses to which categories of virtue can be put but also of unintended uses to which virtue talk is susceptible and of tasks for which virtue thinking is less prepared.