Irresolution and Other Weaknesses of Soul in Descartes

Abstract This paper contributes to a better understanding of Cartesian irresolution by clarifying its relation to akrasia and wantonness. It argues that irresolution (qua passion) is the same as neither akrasia nor wantonness, but is, like them, a kind of weakness of soul. If akrasia consists in having what Descartes calls ‘firm and decisive judgments’ (F&D judgments) but failing to act on them, and wantonness consists in not having any F&D judgments at all, but acting completely at the behest of the passions, then irresolution can be understood as a state between akrasia and wantonness: the irresolute lacks F&D judgments (like the wanton) but (unlike the wanton) actively strives to attain them.