Domains of baseless belief and the characteristics of believers

Abstract Objective An extensive literature examines the prevalence of conspiracy theories and the factors that determine why some people believe them. Conspiracy theories are only one example of baseless beliefs , which we define as beliefs that are not epistemically warranted by the available evidence. The goals of this research were to determine if there are discrete domains of baseless beliefs and to identify the psychological and cognitive factors most closely associated with each type. Methods We surveyed 435 U.S. adults about their baseless beliefs and measured an extensive set of cognitive, epistemological, and personal characteristics. Results Four distinct domains of baseless belief were discovered, which we label conservative controversies, classic coverups, magical thoughts, and pseudoscience. The data suggest the confidence people have in these beliefs differs across domains and reveal clear differences in the cognitive, epistemological, and personality factors predicting belief in each domain. Conclusion Baseless beliefs encompass a number of distinct domains, and the psychological dynamics underlying belief acquisition vary across these domains. This finding suggests caution in generalizing from studies examining only one domain. The prominent role of conservatism documented in the literature on conspiracy theories, for example, is weaker or not present at all in other domains.