Non‐ideal epistemic rationality

Abstract I develop a broadly reliabilist theory of non‐ideal epistemic rationality and argue that if it is correct we should reject the recently popular idea that the standards of non‐ideal epistemic rationality are mere social conventions.

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Publication Details

Journal
Philosophical Issues
Published
2024-09-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12273
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
4.22
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article

Non‐ideal epistemic rationality

Nick Hughes
1 citations
Philosophical Issues
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
4.22
article

Non‐ideal epistemic rationality

Nick Hughes
article en
1 citations

Abstract

Abstract I develop a broadly reliabilist theory of non‐ideal epistemic rationality and argue that if it is correct we should reject the recently popular idea that the standards of non‐ideal epistemic rationality are mere social conventions.

Philosophical IssuesVol. 34(1)
University of Oslo (NO)
Reduced inequalities
Openalex Percentile: Top 6%
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
4.22
DOIOpen Access PDFOpenAlex
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Non‐ideal epistemic rationality — Nick Hughes · Philosophical Issues (2024) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS