Why Do Civil War Successor Parties Renounce Violence?

Why do civil war successor parties (CWSPs) renounce the use of violence as a political tool after civil wars end? If they renounce violence, this is an indicator of their successful transition to democratic competition. I explore a variety of factors that may incentivize a CWSP to renounce violence as a political tactic. These include whether the CWSP is likely to participate in competitive elections, the strength of party organization, the intensity and duration of the previous civil war, and whether the party faces an environment of electoral violence. Using data from the Varieties of Democracy–Parties dataset and other data sources, I find that electoral incentives are related to the renunciation of violence and the threat of electoral violence is negatively related to renunciation. Strength of organization is also negatively related to the renunciation of violence. The implications of these findings are then discussed.

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Publication Details

Journal
The Journal of Politics
Published
2024-09-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1086/732958
Primary Topic
Political Conflict and Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Why Do Civil War Successor Parties Renounce Violence?

John Ishiyama
The Journal of Politics
Political Conflict and Governance
article

Why Do Civil War Successor Parties Renounce Violence?

John Ishiyama
article en

Abstract

Why do civil war successor parties (CWSPs) renounce the use of violence as a political tool after civil wars end? If they renounce violence, this is an indicator of their successful transition to democratic competition. I explore a variety of factors that may incentivize a CWSP to renounce violence as a political tactic. These include whether the CWSP is likely to participate in competitive elections, the strength of party organization, the intensity and duration of the previous civil war, and whether the party faces an environment of electoral violence. Using data from the Varieties of Democracy–Parties dataset and other data sources, I find that electoral incentives are related to the renunciation of violence and the threat of electoral violence is negatively related to renunciation. Strength of organization is also negatively related to the renunciation of violence. The implications of these findings are then discussed.

The Journal of PoliticsVol. 87(2)
University of North Texas (US)
Gender equality
Openalex Percentile: Top 75%
Political Conflict and Governance
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