Fanatical Peace: How Fundamental Disagreements Can Discourage Conflict

It is generally held that a leader’s optimism about the likely outcome of a war can be a cause of war. When two rivals disagree about what they can expect to win by force, both might prefer to fight rather than settle a dispute. This explanation is usually referred to as war resulting from “mutual optimism.” Conventionally, the literature suggests that the more extreme this mutual optimism grows—the wider the gap between leaders’ assessments—the more likely conflict is. We show that there is no necessary, logical reason to believe that divergent beliefs tend to make conflict more likely. In a dynamic bargaining model, we find that increasing leaders’ mutual optimism can prevent war. In fact, conflict can be more likely between actors with similar underlying beliefs than between actors whose beliefs are radically different. We call this “fanatical peace.”

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Journal
The Journal of Politics
Published
2024-09-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1086/732987
Primary Topic
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Fanatical Peace: How Fundamental Disagreements Can Discourage Conflict

Richard Jordan, Peter Bils, Kristopher W. Ramsay
The Journal of Politics
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
article

Fanatical Peace: How Fundamental Disagreements Can Discourage Conflict

Richard Jordan, Peter Bils, Kristopher W. Ramsay
article en

Abstract

It is generally held that a leader’s optimism about the likely outcome of a war can be a cause of war. When two rivals disagree about what they can expect to win by force, both might prefer to fight rather than settle a dispute. This explanation is usually referred to as war resulting from “mutual optimism.” Conventionally, the literature suggests that the more extreme this mutual optimism grows—the wider the gap between leaders’ assessments—the more likely conflict is. We show that there is no necessary, logical reason to believe that divergent beliefs tend to make conflict more likely. In a dynamic bargaining model, we find that increasing leaders’ mutual optimism can prevent war. In fact, conflict can be more likely between actors with similar underlying beliefs than between actors whose beliefs are radically different. We call this “fanatical peace.”

The Journal of Politics
Baylor University (US), Vanderbilt University (US), Princeton University (US)
Reduced inequalities
Openalex Percentile: Top 81%
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
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Fanatical Peace: How Fundamental Disagreements Can Discourage Conflict — Richard Jordan, Peter Bils, et al. · The Journal of Politics (2024) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS