The Domestic Political Costs of Soliciting Foreign Electoral Intervention

When would voters punish politicians for soliciting foreign help to win an election? We used US-based survey experiments to study this question. Our experiments offer a mixed message about public willingness to defend democracy against external interference. On the one hand, the vast majority of voters—from both major parties—were unwilling to defect from candidates who solicited. Candidates could further reduce the domestic costs of soliciting by approaching allies rather than nonallies, refraining from explicit quid pro quos, recruiting elites to defend their behavior, and cultivating uncertainty. On the other hand, candidates who sought foreign help lost support on average, and in many situations, the penalty could be sizable enough to sway an election. Our experiments therefore suggest that a small but consequential sliver of the electorate would punish candidates who solicit and could influence whether and how politicians invite foreign meddling in future races.