Person-first and identity-first approaches to Autism: metaphysical and linguistic implications

Over the past few years, there has been much debate about how autistic people should be described and labeled. Two main tendencies have emerged in this discussion, usually known as the person-first approach and the identity-first approach. While the former proposes to talk about ‘person(s) with autism’, the latter claims that ‘autistic person’ is more adequate. We first discuss person-first and identity-first approaches along with the reasons that have been offered for embracing one or the other. Then we focus on the consequences that both approaches entail: first, the conception of autism as a condition, along with metaphysical conceptions of self and identity; second, linguistic emancipatory possibilities, such as reclamation. We argue that these two approaches ultimately promote a different stance on autism as a condition and that while the reclamation of ‘autistic’ is more clearly aligned with the identity-first view, the person-first approach is not entirely incompatible with some reclamation projects.