Coordination in stag hunt games
Stag hunt games display a tension between a payoff superior option (stag) and a less risky but payoff inferior alternative (hare). We explore that tension by proposing a selection criterion (which we denote as relative salience ) where subjects choose to coordinate in one option by comparing the salience of stag’s main aspect (its payoff) to the salience of hare’s main aspect (its risk) by accounting for both payoff-relevant factors and unobservable individual-specific (idiosyncratic) preferences. Using data from 10 experiments, we find that this criterion is a significant determinant of individual choices in stag-hunt games, outperforming other selection methods. • A trade-off between risk and efficiency helps to explain the observed behavior in stag hunt games. • Unobservable individual-specific preferences play an important role in coordination. • Efficient play requires stag to be substantially more salient or focal than hare. • Data from 10 experiments confirms that relative salience outperforms other selection methods. • Our results highlight the importance of a SHG structure when attempting to ensure efficient behavior.
Authors
- Rui Silva (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7929-0367)
Institutions
- University of East Anglia (GB)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Published
- 2024-09-14
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2024.102290
- Citations
- 2
- Primary Topic
- Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 1.05