Being with Others and the Practice of Theodicy

In this article I aim to highlight one aspect of what it is like to address the problem of evil. The discussion aims to show that the suffering of others comes to matter, in part, because of the way in which we are with others, and they with us. Through a sustained discussion of the film 12 Years a Slave, and drawing on the idea of joint attention, I suggest that the possibility of sharing attitudes with others is central to our experience of the meaning of suffering. In dialogue with the moral philosophy of Stephen Darwall, I highlight the way in which—at least in some significant cases—being with others depends on mutual answerability. These points suggest that whilst moral critics of theodicy are right to emphasise the way that the practice of theodicy can involve a failure to recognise the seriousness of suffering, it is a mistake to think that the suffering of others is ‘hermeneutically off-limits’ to me: whilst we may often be concerned for others, we can also be concerned with them. This, it is claimed, is an intrinsic part of the difficulty of the problem of evil, as well as one reason for its moral significance.