X-Phi and Theory Acceptance in Political Philosophy

Abstract What is the relevance of experimental philosophy (X-Phi) to theory acceptance in political philosophy? To answer this question, the paper distinguishes between four views, to wit: (i) X-Phi as a systematic method to avoid or reduce biases in our moral intuitions— The De-Biasing View ; (ii) X-Phi as a tool for assessing the fruitfulness or consequences of various concepts— The Fruitfulness View ; (iii) X-Phi as the best way to unearth the kind of moral principles we are interested in as political philosophers— The Unearthing Principles View ; and (iv) X-Phi as a way of testing the coherence of principles with folk intuitions— The Defeasible Reason (or Squatters’ Rights) View . The paper argues that the first two views and the last—subject to some clarifications—describe important X-Phi contributions to theory acceptance as this is traditionally understood within contemporary political philosophy. In contrast, the third view goes too far in suggesting that X-Phi can supplant more traditional, in part non-empirical, methods.