Why Moral Bioenhancement Cannot Reliably Produce Virtue

Moral bioenhancement presents the possibility of enhancing morally desirable emotions and dispositions. While some scholars have proposed that moral bioenhancement can produce virtue, we argue that within a virtue ethics framework moral bioenhancement cannot reliably produce virtue. Moreover, on a virtue ethics framework, the pursuit of moral bioenhancement carries moral risks. To make this argument, we consider three aspects of virtue-its motivational, rational, and behavioral components. In order to be virtuous, we argue, a person must (i) take pleasure in doing the right thing and have the correct motivational attitudes; (ii) reason correctly about what is called for in a particular ethical dilemma; and (iii) intentionally and continuously practice and cultivate virtues. These dimensions of morality-in short: precisely those emphasized in a virtue ethics framework-cannot be consistently or reliably met using existing moral bioenhancement technology.

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Publication Details

Journal
The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine
Published
2024-09-08
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhae035
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.34
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Why Moral Bioenhancement Cannot Reliably Produce Virtue

Joseph Vukov, Maya Roytman, Sydney Samoska, Gina Lebkuecher et al.
1 citations
The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine
Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations
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article

Why Moral Bioenhancement Cannot Reliably Produce Virtue

Joseph Vukov, Maya Roytman, Sydney Samoska, Gina Lebkuecher, Marley Hornewer
article en
1 citations

Abstract

Moral bioenhancement presents the possibility of enhancing morally desirable emotions and dispositions. While some scholars have proposed that moral bioenhancement can produce virtue, we argue that within a virtue ethics framework moral bioenhancement cannot reliably produce virtue. Moreover, on a virtue ethics framework, the pursuit of moral bioenhancement carries moral risks. To make this argument, we consider three aspects of virtue-its motivational, rational, and behavioral components. In order to be virtuous, we argue, a person must (i) take pleasure in doing the right thing and have the correct motivational attitudes; (ii) reason correctly about what is called for in a particular ethical dilemma; and (iii) intentionally and continuously practice and cultivate virtues. These dimensions of morality-in short: precisely those emphasized in a virtue ethics framework-cannot be consistently or reliably met using existing moral bioenhancement technology.

The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of MedicineVol. 49(6)
Loyola University Chicago (US), Harvard University Press (US), Wuhan University (CN), Wuhan Business University (CN)
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 41%
Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations
0.34
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