Intentional objects and experience ―Response to my critics

I want to express my gratitude to my critics for the time and effort they spent on engaging with my book. I greatly enjoyed and learned a lot from thinking about their comments. It is a central claim of my interpretation that empirical objects are Kantian outer appearances understood as intentional objects of outer experience. This claim is the focus of the comments of all three critics. Lucy Allais critically examines my account of intentional objects; Markus Kohl and Nicholas Stang raise questions about my account of outer experience. A note about terminology: I refer to the special relation that obtains between a representation and its intentional object as ‘ontological specification.’ Using this terminology, experience ontologically specifies appearances. For ease of communication, in the following, I will no longer explicitly indicate that I am talking about Kantian appearances and outer experience. But unless indicated otherwise, this is how I should be understood. In her useful and instructive contribution to this symposium, Allais focuses on “the basic idea of appealing to intentional objects as an explanation of the mind-dependence of appearances.” Allais claims that since my definition of what I call basic mind-dependence is compatible with a number of different accounts of the nature of appearances, including hers, I turn to the notion of an intentional object to further explain the specific sense in which appearances are mind-dependent. But this strategy can work only if we have an independent account of intentional objects. The central worry of her comments is that most accounts familiar from contemporary theories of perception and thought are unsuitable for explicating the nature of appearances, and I do not say enough to provide a useful, more suitable alternative account. Before responding to Allais's central worry, I would like to clarify that I actually do not appeal to intentional objects as an explanation of the mind-dependence of appearances in the way she suggests. After introducing the proposal that appearances are intentional objects (in section 2.2), I turn to the tricky business of precisely capturing the sense in which they and other intentional objects are mind-dependent (in section 2.3). The first concrete result of these efforts is the definition of basic mind-dependence quoted by Allais. But I do not stop there. As I explicitly note, appearances and other intentional objects are mind-dependent in a much stronger sense. After several further pages of tedious analysis, I propose that they are fully mind-dependent in the sense that they have all of their determinations and other ontological ingredients and, thus, their being solely in virtue of being (possibly or actually) represented by finite minds. I also provide a more formal definition of full mind-dependence (on p. 47), which need not concern us here.1 As far as I can tell, the indicated conception of full mind-dependence is not compatible with Allais's account of the nature appearances. It is intended to conceptually pin down the class of intentional objects; all and only intentional objects are fully mind-dependent. As I go on to say, in the case of appearances, the minds in question are human minds and the representations that ontologically specify them are actual, not merely possible. It seems to me that this is all that needs to be said to explicate the sense in which appearances are mind-dependent. I should also like to note that, contrary to what Allais claims, I do not take ‘in us’ in Kant's frequent locution that ‘appearances are in us’ to be literal―which is why I consistently put in the book. like the ‘in in Kant's that appearances in is to be understood in the sense as in my of intentional objects as objects of of these are of the basic that appearances and other intentional objects are by a special of full mind-dependence as Allais that contemporary accounts of perception and thought the intentional objects of and as objects. that this is central of as intentional that fully mind-dependent a in contemporary accounts is in the of or about objects. are to and be fully mind-dependent. Allais from this that appealing to intentional objects not to explain the nature of appearances. I want to comments in that of the indicated contemporary accounts of perception and thought the from how I is no for my how is to be about This is the why I my of intentional objects in the with a of how I and as (on I in that my from the indicated contemporary In my and refer to and objects of all of which have being solely in virtue of being in case that we want to a the of these and is that first them the them in my for in quoted claim that is by what the of the the intentional of an and what we would not relation to a an object is not to be understood as a or Allais's that appealing to intentional objects is not to explain the nature of appearances is not the only from the that fully mind-dependent objects are not in contemporary accounts of perception and alternative would be that appealing to these contemporary accounts is not to explain the nature of appearances. This is the that I I that can be to a from the a contemporary I that more not the of and us from and of thinking and in precisely from how they to be from contemporary I should also like to that for Kant's conception of appearances from contemporary accounts of perception is a strategy appearances are objects of not perception an in the of experience is not an an I that should not conception of appearances objects of or about objects in to these appearances I also that appealing to and about as can actually be useful to explicate of the nature of appearances. For the objects of and have in with they all are intentional objects. and are in the of an and object of a representation precisely these representations have and are no objects that be with be that intentional objects (in my only in contemporary theories of perception and But this not the case in the of be not all appeal to intentional objects do that But the conception a to the to notion of the of by which “the being of the represented by the as in the is a of an intentional object conception of which are intentional objects of the of all is the on are also a number of by in thinking intentional objects an I other and It seems to me that the that or by of intentional objects in their accounts of perception and thought is more and more to the that intentional objects do not much of a in contemporary This the more worry that my account of intentional objects is to be useful for the nature of appearances. I have to say that I do not what Allais is for what I provide in the book. are three questions that we an account of intentional objects to are intentional do of intentional objects from and what accounts for this the of representations and, how do representations that have intentional be more can be seems to me that my account with to all three to the to be useful for the we are to explicate Kant's account of appearances understood as an ontological in the the first questions are much more the in my to the first is the of full which is the special of mind-dependence that intentional objects. to the question is that all between of intentional objects are in between the representations that ontologically specify of which in in how these representations are that I are the between intentional as objects of the objects of like the of the and the between intentional objects as the objects of the objects of experience. This to the question also that, if is to provide an account of a of intentional much of work will in the special of representations that ontologically specify these objects. The special of representation that ontologically specifies appearances is experience. I about pages to the question is a question in the of and Kant's of is the of the in the I do not an of in the book. I do say a about how experience to objects in the of Kant's account of experience (in section is the of of should I have It is that all of the specific questions that Allais in the of her comments are questions that my account explicitly Allais about the of my to these to be that is different from the that my account is not enough to I will by Allais's of which on that also in and comments. The first my to the question of how to about the ontological of the intentional objects of and to the ontological of appearances, the intentional objects of experience. is that the of intentional objects do not the Allais about this that is to how this can be the case if appearances are merely intentional for no how and from appearances have the ontological of in which is the ontological as other and other objects of This seems to me to be an of a a case of ontological on the of of that ontological be are more being and being mind-dependent and not can be and mind-dependent and or mind-dependent and As I the that are different of and of the most central and most if not of Kant's account of the is are also intentional Allais's of a of the question of what of representation ontologically specifies empirical is that this representation is experience. This me to that in no are empirical that no human will Allais seems to this for she several pages thinking about and how an intentional object for The about my account the of this I should say, I she that for empirical that the of experience is not merely intentional also of the way are in my account of appearances sense in to Allais's account. I am with my to empirical As I are no But I do want to that I with Allais that is a of Kant's that appearances are appearances of in and experience is a of the way in I will have more to say about how this of appearances and experience in in is to be understood on my account in my to the other critics. For I want to of As I also explicitly in the (on p. 47), my of appearances as intentional objects of experience not me from a more account of the on which their and determinations For experience on by are for appearances these in The intended of the in the that appearances and have all of their determinations and other ontological ingredients solely in virtue of being represented in experience is to that, in to experience and its are no further on which appearances as a from or what have is all we need in for to be appearances. of this that in for to be appearances, we also need the in on which experience is a by and in provide the for experience and appearances, and in provide the formal as as The formal are in that have to which all that all representations of have to The formal of experience are the time for are in the of the from and for that in to be experience a representation its objects as and in that in in and to a The are in that is and by in to about which all or that can in the of of representation of objects. are that in to be experience a representation its objects as that this not on special of or their and as to In experience is in with formal which its and on the of which that its intentional objects are in in in formal and of experience are for experience. As I note in the (on p. note and as Kohl the of a in the and the that as if that the formal by are for experience. But I do not that this can be It is to with a that to all formal all of have if that the formal are for would not have the of an of about the of the empirical as we will A case can be that the formal and are for experience. experience from all other of representations that we are Kohl three about this account of experience in and comments. the account empirical to Kant's of from as by me that are in not the first worry, contrary to what I my claim that experience and appearances are in in no or and the first worry I will to these by them in the In the of these I will also several by is an empirical is to the of empirical that objects in that are or other about empirical is to the of how can or the claim that empirical objects first worry is a of the As I that my account of experience for this worry that I explicitly in the (on p. not a The is a worry, a worry that and with for a As I in the (on different of the in the in the of the in the and in the in the to with the of the in as we from several my to first worry is to For are that that empirical objects are not only also or from the of of the the of the question of how they can or the claim that their and experience objects and determinations do not in way on these But is a that empirical objects are or ‘in that empirical objects are intentional objects of experience. In Kant's the the of a different how can or the claim that we have experience. that we have experience is to that empirical objects and have the that experience them to worry on the that my about the of experience and appearances in in is intended to the in the in which for a this that experience is in in is to provide a for the claim that is But the indicated is In to the as to in the in which for an empirical is a which is what I have to do in the book. my to worry is to that my about the of experience and appearances in in is not to the claim that experience is a experience is The question is we have experience. This the question of what I take the of the of experience and appearances in in to be that, on my “the ontological for empirical is in in is what appearances ontological or in with the intentional objects of other of representations as and ontological with the of experience to its to the formal of experience is why appearances as from the of of Kohl that this a further worry, all of from is why this should be to specific of if the of the is from the of to this worry in I do not that “the of the is from the of This is the that the of my to and my with Kohl on this will also in my to worry be on Kant's we to specific of in on the of the of that the is what is other I a on my a a of in being way as an that the object of my perception is in and a that to the of is to the of that this is to how in the of in This is the of Kant's that is a formal as to is also why appearances can be as appearances of in which be said about the objects of and I that, on Kant's all of representations from of by in are in how in the of different of representations and in how the of the different of representations on in a account of how to this is and would take more I have I will the idea with to the between experience and which are in the of the is by the on the of are by the the of the of the of and and are by in to by in In this the the their is to and the in the This is how the of appearances is to in the of in or are by the on the are like are by the the of the of the of and and are by the the and of The of the intentional objects of only on and in by that I have and that I about a a need not on what in are like in the be solely in of my that are not in the of experience. to the question of ontological the thought is that the that in to is not in the by the that After or are on the of seems only that they are ontologically of the is by an of Kant's not in the and the that we have experience. my the is intended to this result by the only for This for I take in Kant's as with the of is a in which what we take to be are or as representations by the on and is this the only for that we have experience to the formal and of experience. can that what we take to be experience to the formal This is way in which we can experience from perception and all other representations as and of them to formal to what Kohl the of to their objects as to a for the that they can only we we that the are by of the For in to the are we would have to be to the representations on which we the of what we take to be experience are But are from and the worry is that what we take to be experience is that a representation like experience for being on or we need is way of that the representations that are we to in this we would have the only for that we have and that empirical objects I have experience. experience is for me only if I can in time on my in the of the first of and Kant's conception of including in that, in I am of my as in I in time on that representations of my the nature of experience is for me only if I can in time on outer that representations of objects in and and the that the is I can in time on outer representations only if these representations as far as their is The explanation for the of outer representations is that these representations are which in the of in as to or experience is for me only if I have outer and an to the I have outer I have outer experience. the only for that I have outer experience is a in which I have outer or of experience is for me only if I have outer experience. and I have outer experience. and objects and For of I this in and will focus only on the of in the of worry, and The idea the in is that, if representations that their representation of a on a by a representation of a in a by a representation of an in of a not with a representation of in time on their For that, their to be much more The thought the in is that, if outer representations or the their would be to a that these representations are by the a of if outer representations these be by in the of in that the of outer is to how as my to worry is that, on my of the the is not that are in the of in that we have outer which that empirical objects The claim that are is for the merely as of the for of its As for the of the I that not that the of representations is to as we as Kohl But I do not this as a for the for my It is not a for my interpretation explicitly this in about the that the that the of outer objects is for the of a of not that representation of outer the time their for the be the of the (in as as in is not a for the in Kant's to be is only that experience in is merely outer experience in this or that experience is merely be to its special and the with the of all on the that we have the that we are in that we have outer experience. a of outer representations is a of a or can be by on the formal of experience. the be with the of outer representations to a that to the formal is as a or I also with Kohl that a of in is with us experience. This is a of the that the of the on an to the It is that, outer representations on which we the of experience are by the as this and this be or not are The also not and in not the of an or representations in that the But would be if the not from these I do not them as for my interpretation As to work on a for the of empirical objects which that not that the the all to the question of how to Kant's would be if no the is useful to a from the of that the indicated of about the of the empirical most be have all have This be a of the we can for be an that to the of empirical objects. the that The that experience to the formal and is a useful But would be if we say more concrete about what Stang my to in and comments. of what in in the of me that I not have in my account I will with a in the that this will to of us which to us is only as us which to all human minds my the experience that ontologically specifies appearances is experience understood as the of all and all of its determinations and other ontological ingredients in virtue of being represented in can be in the of a of all in all time is a or account of the empirical on the of the of human minds that to the formal and of is in the on the by and by more an is a of the empirical that of all and empirical of nature by by the of as Kant's of the of are a and in the and empirical and the of as of are in the and of all empirical by in by are in the and the a of all objects that have by or by on the of the and the on and all and of the objects on that have by on the of the and the on In to that we with a empirical have empirical with of we that the of the is and to that from only with to and and do in that are with the this the It is to be that is an alternative conception of an that from in to this alternative an all of objects and of in or that are on including that will be from the on or that will be in a way that the are with the an as by me only of the and on only that the of objects that are on are not for are of empirical that are not in the are not The that of the claims that are in an will be from the on or in a way that the is with the As a worry, Stang critically that, in on the question appearances are ontologically by or I a that are by the we would have if we to experience objects if we to a of experience by the of As far as I can tell, the that Stang are that we would have if we to experience objects of the indicated by Stang are that we the of But are as by In my the the that appearances are ontologically by experience. But are also that for for the that appearances are ontologically by is that is For that actually to be ontologically in that is merely seems to This also to the account by first is that, my account of are several in which the empirical would turn to be which is and with the of Kant's of these is that all human minds are is that to a I explicitly the in the (on and note that, in this experience would to the on the of the of human minds the time of the I that, the empirical would be only as as represented in the this on is A that the empirical is will as But why would to a It is to that the empirical is in As in the on the to the way are the number of of empirical objects as as the of the empirical in and its in time of are for the are that seems to I that is a and that, if we to this in the by as the that “the and is of what we actually about my account of experience would be with Kant's to Allais's I do not that is a in is a in the sense of in the of by on the of and This of is compatible with my account of experience. is that my account is not in a provide a for the The of empirical which is by my about But this empirical is to me I have the the for the empirical of I explain what I I say that the are in I with Stang that what be fully a this is why I call them I say that an a of all objects that have on the of I do not to that the are a all I is that they are on the I that the empirical of objects and the empirical them as a to For an object to be by of is what for to have But I do not that this me from an empirical for the empirical In to the the empirical are in the as for about how the to the in to the empirical of are not in empirical they are in in and the of I also that, in for the empirical to be in the is not enough for them to merely these that is what the is intended to to be for further of this of is The why I do not provide in the is that a of from Kant's is and would have me far can be said is that an empirical that is in the is in them in the of way in which of is in them to Kant's in the of that in can be from the and empirical this an account is a for the me for that to this Stang this question by that are other in which empirical turn to be and that are compatible with a of For be that in the an object as a or the the object as a the to the of a to that this of experience can no longer be understood as the of all in all But we on to the idea that experience is on the of the of all I am to Stang for my to these alternative accounts of how to about the relation between experience and the of is a the of the I my a and of the seems to me to be the of that is to be Kant's about the nature of I my account is the account would go a and is to be Kant's also a for that This is a tricky and is I will the are in the on the and, in in on the other to the nature of the are the of in or not have is to how we have experience all in my to But we are to what experience would be if we can have for the of we can that the of in and that and the and of the seems to that the of all the if the question is how this be from an independent of far in have that is more can with accounts of the empirical that the as as the accounts Kant's time are with of the the are not is to in the of the I that if the is to with a Kantian account that is of experience as a of is and is no longer a I do that the indicated is and my more in the to Kant's account. and an from of the A merely account of how the of experience the of all is not only not as we also not since a of not empirical of As I empirical objects do not have fully empirical be empirical objects have to have for But they do not have fully that can be for is that experience empirical that are to my account that, to the of a to the of a is a of is that a all that can do is a will on the of the the the different to the of a in the of as by me will be that is in all The of these the as a that all of these also the which is and