Green technology innovation models, environmental regulation and the willingness of government-university-industry to collaborate on green innovation

The process of collaborative green innovation suffers from high R&D risks and externalities, leading to a lack of stability in the alliances. How to enhance the stability of government-university-industry collaborative green innovation has become an urgent problem to be solved. Based on finite rationality and stakeholder theory, this article introduces the concept of comprehensive technology degree of green innovation and constructs the interest relationship of collaborative green innovation of government-university-industry. The article adopts the method of evolutionary game to find the stability conditions and explores the evolutionary stability of the green innovation behaviour of the government-university-industry collaboration under different green technology innovation modes and different environmental regulation intensity through case and simulation analysis. The research results show that the green technology innovation model and the intensity of environmental regulation are important factors influencing the willingness of government, industry and university to collaborate on green innovation. Specifically: the higher the comprehensive technological degree of green technology innovation, the stronger the willingness of government-university-industry to collaborate in green innovation. The environmental tax rate, the incentives for collaborative innovation, and the default fees for collaborative innovation under government supervision are positively correlated with the willingness of government-university-industry to collaborate on green innovation. Government-university-industry collaborative green innovation system • Green innovation and collaborative innovation are studied under the same framework. • A two-dimensional measurement system for green technology innovation models has been established. • The definition of incremental and radical green innovation as a continuous process provides support for quantitative research. • Validation of the effectiveness of environmental regulation tools. • Applicability of evolutionary game models and simulation analysis.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Energy Reports
Published
2024-09-05
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2024.08.031
Citations
14
Primary Topic
University-Industry-Government Innovation Models
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
10.24

Funders

Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Green technology innovation models, environmental regulation and the willingness of government-university-industry to collaborate on green innovation

Yongjie Wu, Yan Li, Yubin Wang, Xiao Zhen-hong et al.
14 citations
Energy Reports
University-Industry-Government Innovation Models
10.24
article

Green technology innovation models, environmental regulation and the willingness of government-university-industry to collaborate on green innovation

Yongjie Wu, Yan Li, Yubin Wang, Xiao Zhen-hong, Zihao Fu
article en
14 citations

Abstract

The process of collaborative green innovation suffers from high R&D risks and externalities, leading to a lack of stability in the alliances. How to enhance the stability of government-university-industry collaborative green innovation has become an urgent problem to be solved. Based on finite rationality and stakeholder theory, this article introduces the concept of comprehensive technology degree of green innovation and constructs the interest relationship of collaborative green innovation of government-university-industry. The article adopts the method of evolutionary game to find the stability conditions and explores the evolutionary stability of the green innovation behaviour of the government-university-industry collaboration under different green technology innovation modes and different environmental regulation intensity through case and simulation analysis. The research results show that the green technology innovation model and the intensity of environmental regulation are important factors influencing the willingness of government, industry and university to collaborate on green innovation. Specifically: the higher the comprehensive technological degree of green technology innovation, the stronger the willingness of government-university-industry to collaborate in green innovation. The environmental tax rate, the incentives for collaborative innovation, and the default fees for collaborative innovation under government supervision are positively correlated with the willingness of government-university-industry to collaborate on green innovation. Government-university-industry collaborative green innovation system • Green innovation and collaborative innovation are studied under the same framework. • A two-dimensional measurement system for green technology innovation models has been established. • The definition of incremental and radical green innovation as a continuous process provides support for quantitative research. • Validation of the effectiveness of environmental regulation tools. • Applicability of evolutionary game models and simulation analysis.

Energy ReportsVol. 12
Harbin University (CN), North University of China (CN), North China University of Technology (CN), Harbin Engineering University (CN), Shanxi Academy of Building Research (CN), Shanxi Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CN)
Shanxi Provincial Education Department
Industry, innovation and infrastructure
Openalex Percentile: Top 2%
University-Industry-Government Innovation Models
10.24
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.