Choking off democratic channels and the resort to violence: how the political genocide of <i>Unión Patriótica</i> (UP) candidates escalated and perpetuated Colombia’s armed conflict

This paper asks how the political genocide of the Unión Patriótica (UP) affected the Colombian armed conflict in Colombia. We are specifically interested in how virtually removing its linked political party as a channel through which to engage in the democratic process led to more violence by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP). Our theory is based on the proposition that the presence of stable democratic processes for airing grievances has a dampening effect on conflict. In addition to situating our argument in the literature, our theory and empirical tests are built on the historical context of the Colombian conflict, the creation of the UP, and the political genocide against that party. We use regression models to test our hypotheses that more killings of UP members will lead to more FARC-EP violence across municipalities in Colombia, and also to less democratic participation. The results provide support for our theory. We conclude by considering ways to further refine the empirical testing of the theory as well as with a consideration of how this paper may contribute to future peace processes.