Distributed Resilient Control for Frequency/Voltage Recovery and Power Sharing in Seaport Microgrids With All-Electric Ships

As the typical cyber-physical system, seaport microgrids (SMGs) are exposed to potential cyberattacks which can directly damage control decisions, hinder power sharing among distributed energy sources (DERs) and then threaten system stability and inverter safety. This article proposes a distributed resilient control strategy for ac SMGs based on the extended state observer (ESO), which is used to estimate and compensate for false data injection attacks (FDIAs) on sensors, actuators, and leader agents. The proposed distributed resilient control depends on the communication cyber composed of virtual variables, which can reduce the impact of malicious attacks on sensors and leader agents. Meanwhile, to mitigate the negative impact of actuator attacks, this article introduces correction values as states and designs the distributed resilient controller based on the ESO through output feedback. The controller can estimate and compensate for FDIAs, achieving consensus tracking of frequency/voltage and power with cooperative uniform ultimate boundedness (UUB). Finally, the real-time simulation experiment based on RT-LAB is designed to verify the effectiveness of the control strategy in multiple scenarios of SMGs.