When Redistribution Backfires Politically: Theory and Evidence from Land Reform in Portugal

Scholars have long recognized that reform policies shape mass politics. We theorize how reform impacts two key but underexamined groups—eligible nonbeneficiaries and ineligible individuals—in addition to beneficiaries and payers. We argue that proximity to policy consequences and the extent of policy reform shapes the behavior of these groups and can drive otherwise unanticipated political dynamics, including backlash against reformers. We test the theory using original data on a major redistributive reform: mid-1970s land reform in Portugal. Exploiting variation in local land reform intensity and a plausibly exogenous “bump” in reform treatment that disproportionately increased proximity to reform in areas of low policy intensity, we find that the reform party, the Communists, retained appeal where land reform was intense but lagged politically in most parishes where reform was partial, mainly among eligible nonbeneficiaries. Counter-reform through land returns then drove polarization, including gains for the Right among ineligible nonbeneficiaries.