Counterevidentials
Moorean constructions are famously odd: it is infelicitous to deny that you believe what you claim to be true. But what about claiming that p, only to immediately put into question your evidence in support of p? In this paper, we identify and analyse a class of quasi-Moorean constructions, which we label counterevidentials. Although odd, counterevidentials can be accommodated as felicitous attempts to mitigate one's claim right after making it. We explore how counterevidentials differ from lexicalised mitigation operators, parentheticals, and anaphoric mitigation devices, and consider some cognate non-assertoric constructions. We conclude by exploring the implications of our analysis for theorising about linguistic responsibility, assertion, and lying.
Authors
- Laura Caponetto (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6528-9843)
- Neri Marsili (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7853-7359)
Institutions
- Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (ES)
- University of Cambridge (GB)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Published
- 2024-09-02
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2390175
- Citations
- 1
- Primary Topic
- Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 4.22