The Public Meeting Paradox: How NIMBY-Dominated Public Meetings Can Enable New Housing

Public meetings to consider new housing proposals often feature visible and vocal opposition from neighboring residents, creating a perception that these meetings impede the growth of the housing supply, contributing to inequality. We analyze a model where residents can legally challenge a developer’s housing proposal. A public meeting serves as a critical tool for developers to identify potential litigants, enabling them to adjust proposals and avoid legal action. Interestingly, developers prefer meetings dominated by opponents since it is easier to identify potentially litigious neighbors. Contrary to common belief, our findings suggest that public meetings dominated by NIMBY opponents can increase housing supply by fostering compromise projects. This challenges the prevailing conventional wisdom that unrepresentative meetings significantly restrict housing development. Our analysis instead focuses attention on the threat of litigation as the key driver of the undersupply of housing.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy
Published
2024-09-02
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1561/113.00000091
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.54
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

The Public Meeting Paradox: How NIMBY-Dominated Public Meetings Can Enable New Housing

B. Pablo Montagnes, Ryan Hübert, Allison K. Cuttner
1 citations
Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy
Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism
0.54
article

The Public Meeting Paradox: How NIMBY-Dominated Public Meetings Can Enable New Housing

B. Pablo Montagnes, Ryan Hübert, Allison K. Cuttner
article en
1 citations

Abstract

Public meetings to consider new housing proposals often feature visible and vocal opposition from neighboring residents, creating a perception that these meetings impede the growth of the housing supply, contributing to inequality. We analyze a model where residents can legally challenge a developer’s housing proposal. A public meeting serves as a critical tool for developers to identify potential litigants, enabling them to adjust proposals and avoid legal action. Interestingly, developers prefer meetings dominated by opponents since it is easier to identify potentially litigious neighbors. Contrary to common belief, our findings suggest that public meetings dominated by NIMBY opponents can increase housing supply by fostering compromise projects. This challenges the prevailing conventional wisdom that unrepresentative meetings significantly restrict housing development. Our analysis instead focuses attention on the threat of litigation as the key driver of the undersupply of housing.

Journal of Political Institutions and Political EconomyVol. 5(1)
Quantitative BioSciences (US), University of California, Davis (US)
Sustainable cities and communities
Openalex Percentile: Top 31%
Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism
0.54
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.