Line‐item vetoes as a coordination mechanism

Abstract Although presidential vetoes are central to the legislative process, the role of total versus line item vetoes (LIV) is largely unclear. While total vetoes are a sign of conflict between the branches, as the literature has emphasized, we argue that LIV function as a negative agenda setting mechanism that enables presidents to coordinate within their coalition. To test our argument, we use an original dataset on all statutes and executive decrees approved and vetoed in Brazil for the period 1988–2010. In both, statutes and decrees, we show that while total vetoes occur when conflict between branches is stronger, LIV happen when such conflict is minimal and presidents have tight control over their coalition. The results are robust across dependent variables, model specifications, and estimation strategies. Our findings highlight that while the total veto is a blunt bargaining mechanism, the LIV provides a scalpel, a much finer tool that helps presidents manage and sustain their congressional coalition.