Do the specific characteristics of female directors work as alternative governance mechanisms to restrict earnings management in a developing country?

Abstract This inquiry probes whether or not female directors and their specific characteristics effectively restrict earnings management (EM) measured by accrual‐based earnings management (AEM) and real‐based earnings management (REM) in a sample of 217 Pakistani companies from 2016 to 2021. The outcomes of the ordinary least squares with panel corrected standard errors demonstrated that boards with female directors are more effective in restricting EM than others. The results also explain that the proportion of female directors on the board and audit committee and the experience of the former are significantly and inversely associated with AEM and REM. However, women directors should be at least two or more on the board to effectively control AEM and REM since the role of a lone female director is insignificant in their mitigation. The positive effect of the female directors' master's or above qualification is slightly higher than their bachelor's or below education in opposing AEM and REM. Furthermore, the business education of female directors significantly, while their non‐business education insignificantly reduces AEM and REM. The findings are consistent and reliable for being validated by the generalised method of moments as an alternative estimator. Overall, the inquiry complements the literature, theory, practice, and policy in several ways.