Research on Carbon Cap Regulation, Retailer Altruistic Preferences, and Green Decision-Making of Manufacturing Enterprises

As manufacturing advances swiftly and public consciousness about low-carbon practices rises, eco-friendly supply chains have seen significant expansion. This study investigates a government-driven green supply chain in two phases, involving a producer and a seller. Four scenario game models are established to determine whether the manufacturer engages in green technology innovation or whether the retailer has altruistic preferences. The Stackelberg game was used to analyze changes in government carbon quota regulations, retail prices of retailers, and manufacturers’ carbon reduction efforts in the context of carbon market trading. Research shows that the government will set looser carbon emission limits for manufacturers when retailers have no altruistic preferences. When carbon prices in the market are low, encouraging manufacturers to invest in green technology innovation enhances social welfare. This study offers essential theoretical backing for the government in crafting carbon quota regulations and aids businesses in making prompt technological innovation choices.