Information Coordination Strategy in Rolling Stock Manufacturing: An Evolutionary Game Approach

In the rail vehicle manufacturing industry, effective information coordination between manufacturers and suppliers is crucial for supply chain performance. However, the presence of externalities can complicate the strategic choices of these stakeholders. This paper investigates the information coordination strategy between rail vehicle manufacturers and suppliers, considering the impact of externalities. By employing evolutionary game theory, we construct an interest matrix and analyze the equilibrium points and strategic choices under various scenarios. Our findings reveal that the degree of information cooperation, the distribution of cooperation income, and the unilateral opportunity income are the key factors influencing the choice of cooperation strategy. Specifically, a higher degree of information synergy and a more balanced distribution of cooperation benefits promote the adoption of cooperation strategies. Conversely, high unilateral opportunity benefits hinder cooperation. These insights provide valuable guidance for managers and decision-makers in the rail vehicle manufacturing industry to design effective information coordination mechanisms and enhance supply chain performance. By understanding the factors that drive cooperation and the strategic dynamics between manufacturers and suppliers, stakeholders can make informed decisions to foster collaboration and optimize their operations.