(De)centralized governance and the value of platform-based new ventures: The moderating role of teams and transparency

Abstract Drawing on institutional and demand-side perspectives, we investigate performance implications of (de)centralized governance modes in platform-based new ventures, and the conditions under which (de)centralization generates more value. Using a sample of 1,431 Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), a new source of entrepreneurial finance, we find that centralization of decision-making is positively associated with platforms’ market value. Further, we consider how platform characteristics affect this relationship, finding that both the presence of an experienced Chief Technology Officer (CTO) and project transparency negatively moderate the positive relationship between centralization and market value. Thus, decentralized platforms need leaders with technical experience and project transparency to generate more value. Overall, this study provides a better understanding of the boundary conditions that increase the value of (de)centralized governance.

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Publication Details

Journal
Small Business Economics
Published
2024-08-31
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-024-00964-6
Citations
9
Primary Topic
Digital Platforms and Economics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
4.99

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article

(De)centralized governance and the value of platform-based new ventures: The moderating role of teams and transparency

Igor Filatotchev, Tom Vanacker, Pierluigi Martino, Cristiano Bellavitis
9 citations
Small Business Economics
Digital Platforms and Economics
4.99
article

(De)centralized governance and the value of platform-based new ventures: The moderating role of teams and transparency

Igor Filatotchev, Tom Vanacker, Pierluigi Martino, Cristiano Bellavitis
article en
9 citations

Abstract

Abstract Drawing on institutional and demand-side perspectives, we investigate performance implications of (de)centralized governance modes in platform-based new ventures, and the conditions under which (de)centralization generates more value. Using a sample of 1,431 Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), a new source of entrepreneurial finance, we find that centralization of decision-making is positively associated with platforms’ market value. Further, we consider how platform characteristics affect this relationship, finding that both the presence of an experienced Chief Technology Officer (CTO) and project transparency negatively moderate the positive relationship between centralization and market value. Thus, decentralized platforms need leaders with technical experience and project transparency to generate more value. Overall, this study provides a better understanding of the boundary conditions that increase the value of (de)centralized governance.

Small Business EconomicsVol. 64(4)
Vienna University of Economics and Business (AT), University of Pisa (IT), King's College London (GB), University of Exeter (GB), Ghent University (BE), Syracuse University (US)
Università di Pisa
Openalex Percentile: Top 5%
Digital Platforms and Economics
4.99
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(De)centralized governance and the value of platform-based new ventures: The moderating role of teams and transparency — Igor Filatotchev, Tom Vanacker, et al. · Small Business Economics (2024) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS