Cybersecurity investments in supply chains with two-stage risk propagation

• Supply chains are vulnerable to direct or indirect cyber-attacks. • Interdependence among supply chain members causes third-party cyber risk propagation. • Cyber threats propagate to all nodes through single or multiple stages. • Different types of attacks affect firms differently. • We determine optimal cybersecurity investments for interconnected supply chain. Cyber-attacks present a significant threat to supply chains as their nodes are directly or indirectly vulnerable to risk propagation at various stages. The risk level varies depending on the type of attack. A cybersecurity insurance offers a practical method to mitigate this risk, and it is crucial to determine optimal cybersecurity investments for all supply chain nodes. Previous studies have overlooked the joint impact of the attack type, two-stage risk propagation, and cybersecurity insurance in optimizing cybersecurity investments. This paper addresses this research gap by examining optimal investments under targeted and opportunistic attacks in a two-stage supply chain using game theory. The findings indicate that optimal investments differ based on the type of attack. For instance, retailers should invest more in cybersecurity under opportunistic attacks, while suppliers need to spend more under targeted attacks. Additionally, the results show that under opportunistic attacks, members should reduce their investments. Conversely, under targeted attacks, investments should initially increase and then stabilize. In the case of opportunistic attacks, suppliers and retailers should prioritize reconfiguring their systems over investing heavily in cybersecurity. The model presented in this paper demonstrates that not all cyber risks are worth defending against and that cybersecurity insurance for the entire supply chain can be more cost-effective than addressing cybersecurity risks individually. The paper also explores the impact of joint decisions on cybersecurity insurance when firms are unwilling to invest individually. The insights obtained enable supply chains to identify their optimal cybersecurity investment strategies effectively.

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Publication Details

Journal
Computers & Industrial Engineering
Published
2024-08-29
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cie.2024.110519
Citations
9
Primary Topic
Information and Cyber Security
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
7.01
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article

Cybersecurity investments in supply chains with two-stage risk propagation

Christoph H. Glock, Sarat Kumar Jena, Manoj Kumar Tiwari, Aishwarya Dash et al.
9 citations
Computers & Industrial Engineering
Information and Cyber Security
7.01
article

Cybersecurity investments in supply chains with two-stage risk propagation

Christoph H. Glock, Sarat Kumar Jena, Manoj Kumar Tiwari, Aishwarya Dash, S.P. Sarmah
article en
9 citations

Abstract

• Supply chains are vulnerable to direct or indirect cyber-attacks. • Interdependence among supply chain members causes third-party cyber risk propagation. • Cyber threats propagate to all nodes through single or multiple stages. • Different types of attacks affect firms differently. • We determine optimal cybersecurity investments for interconnected supply chain. Cyber-attacks present a significant threat to supply chains as their nodes are directly or indirectly vulnerable to risk propagation at various stages. The risk level varies depending on the type of attack. A cybersecurity insurance offers a practical method to mitigate this risk, and it is crucial to determine optimal cybersecurity investments for all supply chain nodes. Previous studies have overlooked the joint impact of the attack type, two-stage risk propagation, and cybersecurity insurance in optimizing cybersecurity investments. This paper addresses this research gap by examining optimal investments under targeted and opportunistic attacks in a two-stage supply chain using game theory. The findings indicate that optimal investments differ based on the type of attack. For instance, retailers should invest more in cybersecurity under opportunistic attacks, while suppliers need to spend more under targeted attacks. Additionally, the results show that under opportunistic attacks, members should reduce their investments. Conversely, under targeted attacks, investments should initially increase and then stabilize. In the case of opportunistic attacks, suppliers and retailers should prioritize reconfiguring their systems over investing heavily in cybersecurity. The model presented in this paper demonstrates that not all cyber risks are worth defending against and that cybersecurity insurance for the entire supply chain can be more cost-effective than addressing cybersecurity risks individually. The paper also explores the impact of joint decisions on cybersecurity insurance when firms are unwilling to invest individually. The insights obtained enable supply chains to identify their optimal cybersecurity investment strategies effectively.

Computers & Industrial EngineeringVol. 197
Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur (IN), Technische Universität Darmstadt (DE), XIM University (IN)
Decent work and economic growth
Openalex Percentile: Top 3%
Information and Cyber Security
7.01
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