Optimal default options
Previous studies of optimal default options demonstrate that either opt-out minimization or maximization is optimal under restrictive conditions. We obtain a general characterization of the solution by studying optimal defaults when one of the problem’s parameters approaches a limiting value. We interpret these “asymptotic optima” as approximate optima for non-limiting cases and justify this interpretation through numerical simulations. When the designer and choosers agree about the activity’s value, simple forms of weighted opt-out minimization are asymptotically optimal. Additional results encompass Pigouvian fees, normative ambiguity, and cases in which the designer and choosers disagree about the activity’s value. • A general characterization of the optimal default options is provided. • The method used involves studying asymptotic optima as approximations. • With no externalities, weighted opt-out minimization is asymptotically optimal. • The accuracy of the approximations is verified through simulations. • Extensions include cases with externalities, Pigouvian fees, and normative ambiguity.
Authors
- Jonas Mueller-Gastell
- B. Douglas Bernheim (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6483-7622)
Institutions
- Advanced Fiber Technologies (United States) (US)
- Stanford University (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Journal of Public Economics
- Published
- 2024-08-29
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105203
- Citations
- 1
- Primary Topic
- Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.54