Parliamentary Censure of Ministers in Uganda: A Motion that May not Cause a Movement

The Ugandan Constitution provides for the cabinet office of Ministers. Ministers are appointed by the President of Uganda with the approval of the Parliament. The President assigns executive portfolios to the ministers and they are answerable to him and he can remove them from office at his pleasure. However, upon a gross abuse of office, they can be censured by the parliament. The ordinary implication of that censure intended a removal from office of the affected minister. The aftermath of the censure leaves the President with powers to take appropriate action if the minister fails to resign. The appropriate action is vague. This paper brings to the fore the anomaly by providing situations where the President failed to remove the censured ministers. It argues that the President did not breach the constitution in those instances where he retained the ministers. The paper justifies a parliamentary censure and advocates for an amendment of the ‘appropriate’ clause to give effect to the intent of the drafters of the constitution regarding the removal of ministers in a censure procedure. Keywords: Parliamentary Censure, Ministers, Appropriate action, Uganda