Revisiting research on the governance of interorganizational relationships

This essay re-examines the literature on the governance of interorganizational relationships, focusing on the insights of alliance research using transaction cost economics. Despite substantial progress, challenges arise because research has not devoted attention to some mechanisms of governance (i.e., administrative controls and supporting legal institutions) compared with others (i.e., incentives). Parties can develop bespoke collaborative agreements that mix and match various mechanisms of governance along these dimensions, rather than accessing a typical bundle commonly associated with a discrete organizational form. This conclusion challenges the iconic governance continuum and surfaces new methodological opportunities for this research stream. The essay also challenges what we think we know by identifying a variety of omitted variable problems that often crop up in governance research (e.g., focusing on the cooperative context of collaboration while not attending to the competitive context, excluding critical administrative structures when studying the interplay between contracts and trust, assuming transactional attributes are exogenous rather than endogenous to a search process, failing to account for shifting institutional supports for collaboration, etc.). By clarifying what we know and do not know about alliance governance, the essay identifies some pathways for developing more reliable, cumulative knowledge on interorganizational relationships.