Financing a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain under Risk Regulations: Traditional Finance versus Platform Finance

Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) frequently face challenges in obtaining financial assistance from traditional banks. Platform Supply Chain Finance (PSCF) has emerged as a promising solution for financing issues among SMEs, with an added focus on integrating sustainability aspects. This study focused on a two-tier supply chain as its primary research topic to find strategies to enhance supplier financial viability and improve the efficiency and profitability of the main manufacturing enterprise. In this study, we establish three distinct hypotheses corresponding to the three models involving supplier and manufacturer participation, encompassing parameters such as production batch size, pricing, and supply chain profit. First, it examined financing decisions through the lens of core enterprise-led platform finance. Second, it applied the Stackelberg game theory to investigate financing decisions in three distinct modes: traditional finance, platform internal finance, and external platform finance. Suppliers, manufacturers, and banks can be seen as participants in a Stackelberg game. In this game, suppliers act as leaders, making production and procurement decisions first, while manufacturers and banks act as followers, adjusting their behavior based on the suppliers’ decisions. Finally, it performed a comparative analysis of decisions and supply chain efficiency across these modes. When the risk regulation cost coefficient falls below a certain threshold, suppliers are willing to set up their own PSCF and there is an optimal level of risk regulation effort within the interval (0, 1). We compare platform finance with traditional finance and find that the traditional finance model maximizes profits for suppliers, while the external financing model maximizes profits for manufacturers and the overall supply chain profit. Findings provide insights for platforms, suppliers, manufacturers, and banks to implement optimal financing and channel structures to increase their profits and promote the sustainable development of the financial supply chain. In addition, future research on blockchain platform models would be highly meaningful.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Sustainability
Published
2024-08-23
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/su16177268
Citations
4
Primary Topic
Supply Chain and Inventory Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
2.11

Funders

Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Financing a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain under Risk Regulations: Traditional Finance versus Platform Finance

Qianqian Zhang, Na Li, Jun Wu, Liyuan Yue
4 citations
Sustainability
Supply Chain and Inventory Management
2.11
article

Financing a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain under Risk Regulations: Traditional Finance versus Platform Finance

Qianqian Zhang, Na Li, Jun Wu, Liyuan Yue
article en
4 citations

Abstract

Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) frequently face challenges in obtaining financial assistance from traditional banks. Platform Supply Chain Finance (PSCF) has emerged as a promising solution for financing issues among SMEs, with an added focus on integrating sustainability aspects. This study focused on a two-tier supply chain as its primary research topic to find strategies to enhance supplier financial viability and improve the efficiency and profitability of the main manufacturing enterprise. In this study, we establish three distinct hypotheses corresponding to the three models involving supplier and manufacturer participation, encompassing parameters such as production batch size, pricing, and supply chain profit. First, it examined financing decisions through the lens of core enterprise-led platform finance. Second, it applied the Stackelberg game theory to investigate financing decisions in three distinct modes: traditional finance, platform internal finance, and external platform finance. Suppliers, manufacturers, and banks can be seen as participants in a Stackelberg game. In this game, suppliers act as leaders, making production and procurement decisions first, while manufacturers and banks act as followers, adjusting their behavior based on the suppliers’ decisions. Finally, it performed a comparative analysis of decisions and supply chain efficiency across these modes. When the risk regulation cost coefficient falls below a certain threshold, suppliers are willing to set up their own PSCF and there is an optimal level of risk regulation effort within the interval (0, 1). We compare platform finance with traditional finance and find that the traditional finance model maximizes profits for suppliers, while the external financing model maximizes profits for manufacturers and the overall supply chain profit. Findings provide insights for platforms, suppliers, manufacturers, and banks to implement optimal financing and channel structures to increase their profits and promote the sustainable development of the financial supply chain. In addition, future research on blockchain platform models would be highly meaningful.

SustainabilityVol. 16(17)
Beijing University of Chemical Technology (CN)
National Social Science Fund of China
Industry, innovation and infrastructure
Openalex Percentile: Top 10%
Supply Chain and Inventory Management
2.11
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.