The Distinction between Chance and Fortune. Arist. <b> <i>Phys</i> </b> . II.6

Abstract With regard to Aristotle’s discussion of chance and fortune in Phys . II.5–6, interpreters maintain that, after having provided a specific definition of fortune, applicable to intentional chance processes, in ch. 5, Aristotle is, in ch. 6, seeking to identify a specific meaning of αὐτόματον, which exclusively applies to strictly natural chance processes. When understood in such terms, however, ch. 6 turns out to be problematic, insofar as the examples Aristotle uses to illustrate αὐτόματον refer to mixed natural and intentional chance processes. To show that ch. 6 is internally consistent, I will argue that Aristotle’s goal simply is to emphasise the generic quality of the notion of αὐτόματον compared to that of τύχη and that the examples are chiefly geared towards this aim. I will also explain why such a treatment of chance is relevant within his critical analysis of Empedocles’ and Democritus’ theories of τύχη and αὐτόματον.