Contiguous Search: Exploration and Ambition on Uncharted Terrain
We provide a framework for analyzing search across correlated samples. The agent—a mineral prospecting team, a drug company, a politician—tracks observations over a Brownian path. The agent chooses the search speed and retrospectively picks the best observation when deciding to complete the search. We show that the optimal search speed is U-shaped: it is highest when approaching a breakthrough or when nearing search termination. Unlike search across independent samples, search optimally stops when observations are sufficiently discouraging, following a drawdown stopping boundary. We also show the tractability and features of optimal search contracts in our setting.
Authors
- Leeat Yariv
- Can Urgun
Institutions
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Princeton University (US)
- Centre for Economic Policy Research (GB)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Journal of Political Economy
- Published
- 2024-08-26
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1086/732889
- Citations
- 3
- Primary Topic
- Auction Theory and Applications
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 1.47