Linnebo on Analyticity and Thin Existence
Abstract In his groundbreaking book, Thin Objects, Øystein Linnebo argues for an account of neo-Fregean abstraction principles and thin existence that does not rely on analyticity or conceptual rules. It instead relies on a metaphysical notion he calls “sufficiency”. In this short discussion, I defend the analytic or conceptual-rule account of thin existence.
Authors
- Mark Povich (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8124-4311)
Institutions
- University of Rochester (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Philosophia Mathematica
- Published
- 2024-08-23
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkae017
- Primary Topic
- Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00