Global Economic Governance between Deadlock and Informality

Abstract Power shifts leading to heightened conflict and negotiation deadlocks, as well as growing institutional fragmentation and informality, constitute major challenges for global economic governance. The three books reviewed in this article provide innovative and unique explanations for these developments, through the lens of Southern countries (Shaffer and Narlikar) as well as the industrialized West (Roger). While the studies by Narlikar and Shaffer highlight changes in the negotiation strategies and the legal capacities of poor countries and emerging powers, Roger develops a theory explaining why economically advanced Western democracies increasingly rely on informal institutions. The article examines how and in what ways the three books complement conventional wisdom in economics, International Political Economy ( IPE ) and International Relations ( IR ) literature on global economic governance. It discusses the books’ contributions to the theorizing of global (economic) governance, the advancements towards a Global IR (and IPE ), the changing power relations in global economic institutions, the domestic and the transnational dimensions of global economic governance, and the role of informality in the design of global economic fora. The conclusion summarizes the main insights offered about the current crises of multilateralism and delineates avenues for future research.